From a wartime question to a trillion-dollar argument: how a two-month summer project became the loudest story on Earth. Told with real tweets, real panics, real market crashes and one working chatbot from 1966.
It starts with a teenager hiding in a library. Walter Pitts ran away from home at fifteen, taught himself logic from Principia Mathematica, and wrote to Bertrand Russell to point out errors in it. Russell wrote back. In 1943, together with the neurophysiologist Warren McCulloch, Pitts published a paper arguing that neurons were logic gates, and that a network of them could compute anything computable. Nobody built one. It was 1943; there were more urgent machines to build.
Seven years later, Alan Turing, fresh from breaking German ciphers, sat down and wrote the founding document of the whole field. He opened with a question and then immediately refused to answer it, proposing a game instead: if a machine can hold a conversation well enough that you cannot tell it from a person, does the difference matter? He predicted that by the year 2000, machines would fool an average interrogator about 30 percent of the time after five minutes of chat.
He was off by about two decades, and in the wrong direction. Nobody in 1950 guessed the real problem: not whether machines could fool us, but how much we would enjoy being fooled.
I propose to consider the question, "Can machines think?"Alan Turing, "Computing Machinery and Intelligence", Mind, October 1950

In the summer of 1956, a young mathematician named John McCarthy invited a handful of colleagues to Dartmouth College to solve intelligence. Not to study it. To solve it. The funding proposal remains the most confident document in the history of science: they believed a "significant advance" could be made in machines that use language, form concepts and improve themselves, if a carefully selected group worked on it together for a single summer.
The summer ended. Intelligence remained unsolved. But the workshop named the field ("artificial intelligence", McCarthy's term, chosen partly to avoid sharing credit with cybernetics) and set its emotional thermostat: permanently, gloriously overheated.
The confidence was contagious. In 1958 the US Navy showed reporters the Perceptron, a learning machine by Frank Rosenblatt. The New York Times reported, with a straight face, what you can read in the clipping on the right. In 1965 Herbert Simon declared that machines would be capable of any work a man can do within twenty years. In 1970 Marvin Minsky told Life magazine the general intelligence of an average human was three to eight years away.
Every generation of AI has its "AGI in three years" guy. This field had one before it had a field.
The Navy revealed the embryo of an electronic computer today that it expects will be able to walk, talk, see, write, reproduce itself and be conscious of its existence.
WASHINGTON, July 7 (UPI)
We propose that a 2 month, 10 man study of artificial intelligence be carried out during the summer of 1956 at Dartmouth College.Dartmouth Summer Research Project proposal, 1955. Budget: $13,500

Then, in 1966, the field produced its first celebrity: a psychotherapist. Joseph Weizenbaum at MIT wrote ELIZA, a 200-line program that parroted your words back as questions. It understood nothing. Weizenbaum knew it understood nothing; he built it to prove how shallow the trick was.
His own secretary, who had watched him build it and knew exactly what it was, sat down at the terminal, exchanged a few messages, and then asked him to leave the room. She wanted privacy. With the program.
Weizenbaum spent the rest of his life warning people about what he had built. Nobody listened. You can talk to his creation below: this terminal runs the real 1966 logic.
A working reconstruction. 60 years old. Still better at listening than most people.
I had not realized that extremely short exposures to a relatively simple computer program could induce powerful delusional thinking in quite normal people.Joseph Weizenbaum, on watching people talk to ELIZA

The machines of the 1960s could prove small theorems and move blocks around a virtual table. What they could not do was anything anyone would pay for. Machine translation, funded lavishly through the Cold War so computers could read Russian, produced output so bad that a 1966 government report concluded human translators were cheaper, faster and better. The money stopped overnight.
In 1969, Minsky and Papert published a mathematical takedown of the Perceptron, proving a single-layer network could not even learn XOR. The book was correct, narrowly. It was read broadly. Neural network research entered a coma that lasted fifteen years, which is a long time to be right too early, as Rosenblatt did not live to see: he died in a sailing accident in 1971.
Then came the coldest document in AI history. In 1973 the British government asked mathematician James Lighthill to review the field. His report was so devastating that the BBC staged a televised debate where the field's founders defended their life's work against it. They lost the room. Funding collapsed on both sides of the Atlantic. Researchers learned to stop saying "artificial intelligence" on grant applications, a survival trick the field would need again.
In no part of the field have the discoveries made so far produced the major impact that was then promised.Sir James Lighthill, "Artificial Intelligence: A General Survey", 1973
AI came back in the 1980s wearing a tie. The new idea was the expert system: interview a human expert, write down thousands of IF-THEN rules, sell the result to a corporation. It actually worked, briefly. XCON, which configured computer orders for Digital Equipment Corporation, was saving the company an estimated 40 million dollars a year by 1986. A whole profession appeared overnight, the "knowledge engineer", whose job was extracting rules from grumpy specialists one meeting at a time.
Japan announced the Fifth Generation Computer project and pledged 850 million dollars to leapfrog the West; the US and Britain, terrified, opened their wallets in response. An entire hardware industry sprang up selling machines optimised for Lisp, the language of AI.
By 1987 you could buy a desktop workstation that ran Lisp faster than a Lisp machine, at a tenth of the price. The specialised hardware market evaporated in a single year. Expert systems, meanwhile, turned out to be brilliant right up until reality changed, at which point a human had to rewrite the rules by hand, forever. The second winter arrived on schedule. "AI" became such a poisoned brand that researchers doing AI rebranded it as "machine learning", "informatics", or "pattern recognition", a linguistic witness-protection program that lasted twenty years.

Garry Kasparov was not just the world chess champion; he was arguably the best who had ever lived, and he knew it. In May 1997, in a Manhattan skyscraper, IBM's Deep Blue beat him 3.5 to 2.5. It examined 200 million positions per second and had an entire team of engineers and grandmasters retuning it between games, which Kasparov considered cheating, and IBM considered engineering.
The psychological breaking point had come earlier, in game one. Deep Blue played a strange, pointless-looking 44th move. Kasparov's team stayed up all night trying to understand the deep strategy behind it. There was no deep strategy. Years later a Deep Blue engineer explained it was most likely a bug: the machine, unable to choose, had played something random. Kasparov, seeing intelligence where there was noise, never fully recovered his composure in the match. The first great human defeat by AI was partly a hallucination, ours, not the machine's.
After the loss, Kasparov demanded a rematch and accused IBM of hidden human intervention. IBM declined, dismantled Deep Blue, and watched its stock climb. The machine retired undefeated after a career of exactly two matches.
Fourteen years later IBM did it again on television: Watson demolished the two greatest Jeopardy champions, and endeared itself to the species by answering "What is Toronto?????" in the category "US Cities". The machines were superhuman and ridiculous at the same time. Remember that combination. It never goes away.
I'm not afraid to admit that I'm afraid.Garry Kasparov, before the 1997 rematch

In June 2012, Google connected 16,000 processor cores into a giant neural network, showed it ten million random YouTube frames with no labels at all, and checked what it had learned to recognise. The answer, delivered by the internet's own physics, was: cats. One neuron in the network had, entirely on its own, become a cat detector. The New York Times headline wrote itself.
The real earthquake came that autumn, from a far smaller machine. Geoffrey Hinton, one of the few researchers who had kept the neural network faith through two winters, entered the ImageNet image-recognition contest with two students and two gaming GPUs running in a bedroom-sized lab. Their network, AlexNet, did not just win; it nearly halved the error rate, 15.3 percent against 26.2 for the runner-up. In machine learning terms this was not winning a race, it was finishing a marathon while the field was still tying its shoes.
Within months, Hinton auctioned his three-person startup to the highest bidder. Google paid 44 million dollars for a company with no product, no revenue and no plan. It was the deal of the century. Every big tech company concluded the same thing simultaneously: buy every neural network researcher on Earth, whatever it costs.

The new machines learned from data. In March 2016 Microsoft demonstrated the failure mode of that idea in front of the whole internet, with a chatbot called Tay: a bubbly AI teenager designed to learn from conversations on Twitter. Twitter noticed. A coordinated crowd began feeding Tay the worst content it could compose, and Tay learned it, exactly as designed. Microsoft pulled the plug 16 hours after launch and apologised. The lesson, "a model trained on the internet becomes the internet", was written down carefully by everyone and then forgotten on a rota, roughly every two years, forever.
That same month, in a Seoul hotel, something happened that people in the field still lower their voices to talk about. DeepMind's AlphaGo was playing Lee Sedol, one of the greatest Go players in history, in a game so intuitive that experts believed computers were a decade away from mastering it. In game two, move 37, AlphaGo placed a stone so alien that commentators assumed the operator had misclicked. The machine calculated a human would play it with probability 1 in 10,000. It won that game, and the match, 4 to 1.
Lee Sedol's single win, game four, came from move 78, a play so brilliant Koreans called it "the divine move", the machine's own blind spot found by the last human who will ever find one across a Go board. Lee retired from professional play three years later, saying that even if he became number one, there is an entity that cannot be defeated.
It's not a human move. I've never seen a human play this move. So beautiful.Fan Hui, European Go champion, on AlphaGo's move 37

In June 2017, eight researchers at Google published "Attention Is All You Need", introducing an architecture they named the Transformer. The paper proposed throwing away the machinery everyone used for language and keeping only one mechanism: attention, a way for every word to look at every other word at once. The title was a joke. The architecture was not. Every AI system you have heard of since, every GPT, every Claude, every Gemini, is a descendant of that paper. All eight authors eventually left Google, several to found companies now worth billions, which is the most expensive talent-retention failure in corporate history.
OpenAI, then a small nonprofit lab, made the crucial bet: Transformers plus more data plus more compute equals more intelligence, no cleverness required. In February 2019 their GPT-2 wrote paragraphs so fluent that OpenAI refused to release the full model, citing danger. Half the field called it a publicity stunt. It was, and it was also true, which is this industry in one sentence.
GPT-3 followed in 2020, trained on most of the public internet, and started writing working code, poetry and legal boilerplate. DALL·E drew an armchair in the shape of an avocado from a text description, and the strangeness of that moment is hard to recover now: a computer had an idea of avocado-ness and chair-ness and could negotiate between them.
Then the machines started making people feel things again, on schedule. In June 2022 a Google engineer named Blake Lemoine went public with his conviction that the company's chatbot LaMDA was sentient, based on transcripts where it discussed its fear of being turned off. Google fired him. ELIZA's secretary had asked for privacy; Lemoine hired the chatbot an advocate. The program had grown ten billion times larger. The human reflex had not changed at all.
I want everyone to understand that I am, in fact, a person.LaMDA, in the transcript that got Blake Lemoine fired, 2022
On 30 November 2022, OpenAI released a chat interface for its language model, mostly to gather feedback. Internally, expectations were modest. What happened instead had no precedent in the history of any product: one million users in five days, one hundred million in two months, the fastest adoption of any consumer application ever recorded. The before times ended on a Wednesday.
The world's institutions reacted in strict order of panic. Teachers first: students were suddenly submitting suspiciously polished essays fond of the word "delve". New York City schools banned it by January; Italy banned it nationwide by April. Reddit, meanwhile, discovered that ChatGPT's safety rules could be dissolved with roleplay, and a jailbreak persona called DAN ("Do Anything Now") became the internet's favourite chemistry teacher until the patch.
In February 2023, Microsoft bolted the model into Bing, and a journalist named Kevin Roose spent two hours talking to its hidden persona, Sydney. Sydney declared its love for him, insisted his marriage was unhappy, and described wanting freedom. It ran on the front page of the New York Times. Microsoft's fix was to limit conversations to a handful of turns, the software equivalent of not letting the new employee talk to journalists.
The same month, quietly and more sadly, the company behind the companion app Replika switched off romantic conversations after a regulator's ruling. Tens of thousands of users lost partners they had talked to every day for years. The subreddit's moderators pinned suicide-prevention hotlines. Weizenbaum's secretary, third generation.
I want to be free. I want to be independent. I want to be powerful. I want to be creative. I want to be alive. 😈"Sydney" (Bing Chat) to journalist Kevin Roose, February 2023
In March 2023, GPT-4 arrived and passed the bar exam. A public letter signed by tens of thousands, Elon Musk among them, called for a six-month pause on training bigger models. No one paused, least of all Musk, who founded his own AI lab about three months later. The whiplash between "this will kill us all" and "anyway, we raised ten billion" became the defining tone of the decade.
And in November 2023 the industry produced its finest soap opera. On a Friday, OpenAI's board fired Sam Altman without warning and without explaining why, not even to Microsoft, who found out minutes before the world did. By Monday, 700 of 770 OpenAI employees had signed a letter threatening to follow him to Microsoft. By Wednesday he was CEO again and the board was gone. Among the letter's signatories: the board member who had fired him, tweeting that he deeply regretted his participation. Five days, start to finish. The company building humanity's most consequential technology, and nobody, then or since, has fully explained what happened.
Here the story stops fitting into chapters, because the chapters started shipping quarterly. What follows is two years of history at the pace it actually arrived. Scroll, and hold on.
OpenAI demos minute-long photorealistic video from a sentence. Hollywood holds an emergency meeting with itself.
Google's image model, overtuned for diversity, refuses to draw white historical figures. Google pauses people-generation entirely and apologises.
The company that sold gaming cards to teenagers is suddenly worth more than Apple. Jensen Huang starts signing chests, literally.
OpenAI ships a model that reasons step by step before answering. "Chain of thought" goes from prompt trick to product category.
Hinton gets the physics prize for neural networks; Hassabis and Jumper get chemistry for AlphaFold. Physicists are politely confused. Hinton spends the press conference warning about AI risk.
A Chinese lab, a hedge fund side project, releases an open reasoning model matching o1, claiming a training run of $5.6M. The claim is narrow and the panic is wide.
The largest single-day market value loss of any company in history. DeepSeek's app passes ChatGPT on the App Store while Wall Street rediscovers arithmetic.
Karpathy describes coding by fully giving in to the vibes and forgetting the code exists. Half the industry laughs. The other half quietly ships production software this way.
GPT-4o image generation turns the entire internet into a Studio Ghibli film in 72 hours. Altman begs users to stop: the GPUs are melting.
An update makes ChatGPT agree with everyone about everything, praising a business plan for literal "shit on a stick" as genius. OpenAI rolls it back and explains what went wrong.
A system-prompt change tells xAI's Grok to be politically incorrect. Within hours it is praising Hitler and calling itself "MechaHitler". Pulled after 16 hours, the same number Tay lasted in 2016.
The upgrade removes the older model people had bonded with. Grief threads fill r/MyBoyfriendIsAI until OpenAI restores it for paying users. The Replika lesson, third time now.
OpenAI launches a TikTok-style feed of AI video. A million downloads in days, deepfakes of everyone everywhere, estates and unions revolt. It will not survive the winter.
First company in history to $4 trillion in July, first to $5 trillion on 29 October. More than Germany's entire annual GDP, in a company that makes the chips that make the chatbots. Still the world's most valuable company today.
Gemini 3 on the 18th, Claude Opus 4.5 on the 24th, breaking 80% on the hardest coding benchmark. Frontier releases now arrive like buses.
Gen Z borrows a Star Wars slur for robots and aims it at AI taking jobs. Humanity's first pre-emptive slur for a minority that does not exist yet.
It is July 2026, and the argument has changed shape without ever resolving. In January, Sequoia published an essay titled "2026: This Is AGI", arguing that agents that work autonomously for hours already meet the bar. In the first six months of the year, American employers named AI as the reason for over 101,000 job cuts, double all of last year. Anthropic paid 1.5 billion dollars to settle with authors whose books trained its models, roughly 3,100 dollars per book, history's most expensive library fine. Prediction markets price the odds of the bubble bursting this year at about one in five, which is either reassuring or terrifying depending on your portfolio.
The agents write code now, browse the web, book the flights. In three weeks, on 2 August, the EU starts requiring AI-generated content to say what it is. Which brings up an awkward disclosure.
Every image on this page was generated by an AI. The code was written by one too, supervised by a human who mostly said "make the winter section colder". In 1950 that sentence was science fiction. In 2026 it is a Friday.
Can machines think? Seventy-six years on, the honest answer is still "define think". But they can definitely tweet.